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PORTRAIT OF A JUDGE: JUDITH S. KAYE, DICHOTOMIES, 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Susan N. Herman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: A CAREER OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 
First, let me say how honored and delighted I am to be here to 
start us out on this afternoon‘s project, which I would describe as all 
of us working together to compose a verbal portrait of Chief Judge 
Judith S. Kaye to go along with the very impressive physical 
portrait now gracing the back wall of this courtroom.  In painting a 
portrait, we all start with our sketches and our mental snapshots of 
particular scenes or moments.  So before getting to the topic on 
which I‘ve been asked to speak, Chief Judge Kaye‘s scholarship, I 
want to start by sharing with you a few of the snapshots in my 
mind—my own personal memories and impressions of Chief Judge 
Kaye over the years—because they are a key part of the background 
for my piece of the portrait we are creating today. 
A.  Judith Kaye and the New York Jury 
The first time that I saw Judith Kaye in action was when I‘d been 
called for jury duty in New York City some years ago.  I was sitting 
among the pool of prospective Brooklyn jurors when a video came on 
featuring Judith Kaye speaking to all of us there.  This was 
something that had never happened before—that anybody, no less 
the Chief Judge of New York State, really tried to explain to 
prospective jurors what they were being asked to do and why it was 
important, rather than just intoning some Law Day homilies and 
 
* Susan N. Herman is Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and President 
of the American Civil Liberties Union.  B.A., Barnard College, 1968; J.D., N.Y.U. Law School, 
1974.  The author wishes to thank Rita Cant for her heroic research assistance and the 
Capital District Women‘s Bar Association and the New York Court of Appeals for the 
invitation to speak at the unveiling of Chief Judge Kaye‘s portrait. 
This article was first presented as a speech in tribute to Chief Judge Kaye at her portrait 
unveiling at the New York Court of Appeals in October 2011.  Transcription of the remarks 
was graciously provided through the financial support of the Historical Society and the 
Capital District Women‘s Bar Association. 
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then deluging them with commands and cattle-herding 
bureaucracy.  But there was Chief Judge Kaye up on the screen 
explaining eloquently and inspiringly why she believed jury duty to 
be a critical part of our constitutional system.  Her remarks 
signaled that I, along with everyone else in the room, was being 
taken seriously as an integral part of the justice system and was 
entitled to respect.  In addition, this video (which I‘m sure Chief 
Judge Kaye supervised because no detail went unnoticed) used 
filmmaking and storytelling arts to communicate with people—in a 
way that could really capture their imaginations—why they were 
being asked to give up a part of their personal lives to perform this 
public function.  Instead of just assuming that jury service was a 
fact of life, the video treated the opinions of the prospective jurors 
about their jury service as important.  And so the video took pains 
to educate, explain, and persuade so that the prospective jurors 
would have a basis for deciding for themselves that they were doing 
something valuable. 
I don‘t know how many of you may have seen this video, and I 
actually don‘t know if it‘s still being shown.  But even though I don‘t 
recall exactly how long ago I was called to jury duty on that 
occasion, I vividly recall that in this video—while the voices of 
Judge Kaye and other experts talked admiringly about the nature 
and history of our jury system—the viewer was shown a 
reenactment of an alternative system of justice from our Anglo-
American past: trial by ordeal.  A woman dressed in appropriate 
period costume was being led into the water by uniformed 
purveyors of justice to see if she would sink or float.  My fellow 
Brooklynites hooted at the idea that whether or not the water 
rejected her could be regarded by anyone as a reasonable basis for 
deciding whether or not this woman was a witch, a rather 
questionable charge to begin with.  After seeing this video, I was not 
the only person in the room who then thought: Of course I want to 
be part of a reasonable and fair system for protecting people against 
unjust punishment.  Even that brief reenactment—inviting viewers 
to empathize with the woman being subjected to such terrifyingly 
arbitrary treatment—helped to persuade the viewers that such 
outmoded forms of trial are no way to make a decision and certainly 
not a way they would want important decisions about their own 
lives to be made.  That perception made the prospect of disrupting 
one‘s own everyday life for jury service sting a little less. 
That video, of course, was just one part of Chief Judge Kaye‘s 
important campaign—one of her priorities on assuming her position 
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as Chief Judge—to transform the experience of jury duty for all the 
people of the State of New York.  And as a first glimpse of Judge 
Kaye, the campaign reveals features of its architect that have 
become confirmed through later experience: brilliance tempered 
with humanity and humility, a deep and abiding love and respect 
for our Constitution and system of justice, devotion to efficiency 
without neglecting the humanity of the people affected by the 
system in question, and a view of the arts as a partner of the law. 
So this is a good beginning for one of my themes for today, which 
is to note that any portrait of Chief Judge Kaye has to be multi-
faceted because Judith Kaye cannot be pigeonholed into a few ‗this 
is what she‘s like‘ adjectives.  Somehow Chief Judge Kaye manages 
to bridge what people often regard as dichotomies.  Take Aristotle‘s 
dichotomy of the man (or woman) of theoretical wisdom and the 
man (or woman) of practical wisdom—supposedly two distinct and 
defining models of how people think.1  Even in this little video about 
jury duty, Kaye shows her theoretical wisdom: the intellectual 
rationalization and eloquent articulation of the importance of the 
jury trial and its role in the American justice system.  At the same 
time, the transformation of the experience of jurors in New York 
State worked on a very practical level.  In addition to offering 
inspiration, Chief Judge Kaye was also paying attention to 
promoting the physical comfort of jurors and prospective jurors, to 
treating them with dignity, and to figuring out ways to avoid 
wasting their time.  But this was more than just a case of 
accomplishing two unrelated goals with one set of actions.  The 
theory—that jury service is one way in which the Constitution 
empowers the People—was integrally tied to these practical 
innovations.  Taking jurors seriously is more than just kindness.  It 
is the result of recognizing that jurors are one-half of our judicial 
system, and therefore should not be treated as ignorant, surly, 
temporary servants of judges who show up only because they are 
compelled to do so, and need to be manhandled into serving their 
function.  By treating jurors with respect, we show them that the 
constitutional theory that ―We, the People‖ are the true 
government2 is actually being put into practice.  This attention to 
both the theory3 and practice of jury service has been an invaluable 
 
1 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV, at 17678 (Sarah Brodie, ed. & Christopher 
Rowe, ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
2 U.S. CONST. pmbl.     
3 Judge Kaye has also contributed to the academic scholarship on jury reform.  See Judith 
S. Kaye, Why Juries? Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 185, 185–88 (2008) 
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contribution to the people of New York State and to justice 
generally. 
So that video and that campaign are snapshot number one. 
B.  Judith Kaye, Interviewee 
The first time that I actually spoke with Chief Judge Kaye was in 
anticipation of a program in which we were both involved.  The 
National Association of Women Judges had planned a Saturday 
night dinner during its annual conference and had decided that the 
entertainment at the end of the dinner would be something of great 
significance to all the women judges in the room: an interview with 
the first woman justice on the United States Supreme Court, 
Sandra Day O‘Connor, and the first woman judge on the New York 
Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye.  I was invited to conduct that after-
dinner interview.  As my husband quipped, it was my chance to be 
Oprah. 
We had planning calls: I spoke with both Justice O‘Connor and 
Chief Judge Kaye on the telephone.  When I spoke with Judith 
Kaye, the first thing she said to me was, ―I see we both went to 
Barnard and to NYU Law School.‖  Now isn‘t this typical?  As busy 
as she must have been, she had taken the time to look me up and 
had done research on me.  She told me at one point that she was a 
bit nervous about what I might ask her during the interview—
which she needn‘t have been, as she handled all of the questions 
beautifully.  Here again, Judith Kaye bridged a dichotomy: between 
her own superstar stature and a genuine humility that is not 
always easy for such a public figure to maintain. 
The conference at which this dinner was scheduled to take 
place—and did take place—was held during the first week of 
October 2001, just a few weeks after 9/11, in New York City.  The 
dinner had originally been scheduled to take place at the elegant 
Windows on the World restaurant atop the World Trade Center, a 
restaurant which had suddenly and shockingly ceased to exist.  
 What was quite remarkable was that so many of those women 
 
(explaining jury reform in terms of public outreach and courthouse team building); Judith S. 
Kaye, Why Every Chief Judge Should See 12 Angry Men, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (2007) 
(recognizing the advances in the jury system—including the amenities, diversity, and 
technology—since the release of the film); Judith S. Kaye & Albert M. Rosenblatt, 
Introduction to Special Edition on Juries, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (2001) (identifying New York‘s 
efforts at jury reform since 1993); Judith S. Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 
ALB. L. REV. 1491, 149496 (1999) (extolling changes to summoning methods and jury 
sequestration that have made New York courts more juror-friendly). 
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judges were willing to come to New York anyway, resisting the 
climate of fear that surrounded New York City at the time, and that 
the planning committee was able to hastily relocate the dinner to a 
hotel in midtown.  In this highly charged atmosphere, the interview 
was especially moving and the audience was rapt.  Justice O‘Connor 
wryly referred to herself as the FWOTSC (First Woman on the 
Supreme Court, an acronym for the way in which she was so 
frequently described) and Judith Kaye shone as the FWOTNYCA 
(First Woman on the New York Court of Appeals) as well as the 
FWCJOTNYCA (First Woman Chief Justice of the New York Court 
of Appeals). 
C.  Judith Kaye and Law and . . . 
The third vignette that I want to share with you occurred in this 
very courtroom.  After the Court of Appeals building had been 
renovated (a process of which Judge Kaye was justifiably proud 
because it came out beautifully), Chief Judge Kaye decided to 
celebrate the new courthouse by holding a lecture series featuring 
multidisciplinary topics, like law and architecture, instead of just 
law.  I was invited to speak on a law and literature topic: the People 
v. Gillette case4—the New York case which was one of the models for 
Theodore Dreiser‘s great novel, An American Tragedy.5  
Interestingly enough, the person who was paired with me to speak 
that evening was Francesca Zambello, who had recently directed 
the Metropolitan Opera production of an opera based on An 
American Tragedy.6  Chief Judge Kaye clearly delighted in the 
literature aspect every bit as much as the law, and in managing to 
include her beloved world of opera within the confines of the 
courthouse. My husband and I had the great pleasure of having a 
personalized, guided tour of the newly renovated courthouse by 
none other than tour guide Judith Kaye.   
Here again you can see dichotomies being bridged: there‘s the 
champion of the law and there‘s also the lover, appreciator, and 
missionary of the arts—literature, opera, architecture; and again 
Kaye scarcely seems to notice any tension between what a lot of 
people would regard as very different and even irreconcilable 
enterprises. 
 
4 People v. Gillette, 83 N.E. 680 (N.Y. 1908). 
5 THEODORE DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1926). 
6 Susan N. Herman, Dreiser “American Tragedy” The Law and the Arts, N.Y. CT. APP. 
LECTURE SERIES (June 26, 2006), http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/imptwebcasts.htm. 
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D.  Judge Kaye and the Two Hats 
I want to tell you about one more encounter I had with Chief 
Judge Kaye, not counting the numerous times we‘ve bumped into 
each other at the Metropolitan Opera or as strap-hanging fare-
payers in the New York City subway.  (Imagine that: the Chief 
Judge of the State of New York right there in the subway along with 
everybody else, rather than spending all her travel time in 
limousines.)  The last time I saw Chief Judge Kaye in a professional 
capacity before today was at a session the New York State Bar 
Association held in which they invited Chief Judge Kaye to give 
some valedictory remarks and invited some other people (including 
her successor, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman) to talk about her 
tenure on the New York Court of Appeals.  Now at that talk I heard 
Judge Kaye for the first time make the priceless comment that 
Judge Lippman quoted this morning about her two jobs.  She 
explained that, somewhat to her surprise as she got down to work, 
the job of Chief Judge turned out to comprise two distinct jobs.  One 
of those jobs is serving as the Chief Administrative Judge of all of 
New York, presiding over all the courts of the state.  I think Judge 
Newton is going to be talking about some of the things that Chief 
Judge Kaye did in that capacity. 
The second job, of course, is being Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals itself.  This entails acting as a judge—hearing the 
arguments, deciding the cases, writing the opinions—in addition to 
worrying, as Chief, about the well-being and the functioning of the 
New York Court of Appeals.   
I‘m going to repeat Chief Judge Kaye‘s memorable line, even 
though Chief Judge Lippman already mentioned it, because I 
shamelessly plagiarize this humorous but apt summary all the time.  
―Each of those jobs,‖ said Kaye, ―took up eighty percent of my time.‖  
I am sure that all of us who know Judge Kaye would regard that 
quip as more true than the laws of nature would seem to allow.  
There are some people who just seem to have more hours in their 
day than anybody else and Judith Kaye is one of those people.  And 
there again in that double job we see a kind of dichotomy being 
transcended.  In addition to a thirty-eight hour day, it takes 
tremendous practical skills, administrative skills, and managerial 
skills to run the courts of New York State, and to be their 
administrator.  And it takes a somewhat different range of skills, 
including serious intellectual chops, to be a great judge. 
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II.  JUDITH KAYE, SCHOLAR 
I will now turn to the matter of Chief Judge Kaye‘s scholarship, 
because other speakers more familiar with the courts from the 
inside than I am are going to focus on what Chief Judge Kaye did as 
an administrator of the courts and as a jurist.  As a professor, it‘s 
left to me to talk about Chief Judge Kaye‘s writing beyond judicial 
opinions.  The first thing that I want to note is that when you factor 
in the amount of time that it consumes to be chief judge of all the 
courts of New York State as Chief Administrative Judge and to 
have the full workload of a judge on the Court of Appeals, it is 
nothing less than astonishing that Judge Kaye managed during 
that same period of time to publish over two hundred articles.7  If 
you add another 80 percent for her writing job, by my math we‘re up 
to at least 240 percent of an average person‘s time. 
When you look at Chief Judge Kaye‘s list of articles and the range 
of things she‘s written about, you notice a few things right away, in 
addition to the sheer volume of her productivity.  One is that there‘s 
a kaleidoscopic range of topics.  Judge Kaye has written traditional 
law review articles in the usual scholarly art form, voluminous 
footnotes and all, about substantive legal topics.  I will focus, in a 
few minutes, on one of those topics in particular, state 
constitutional law, where I think her contributions have been quite 
remarkable.  In addition to articles about the law in this area and 
beyond, the list includes a lot of articles about the administration of 
courts, about innovation in the courts, and about how to handle 
particular aspects of court management.8  There are articles about 
 
7 See Biography of Judith Kaye, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, 
http://www.skadden.com/index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=9178 (last visited May 22, 2012). 
8 See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Pace Law Review Symposium: New York Matrimonial 
Commission, 27 PACE L. REV. 549, 549–50 (2007) (encouraging innovation and cultural 
change in matrimonial litigation); Judith S. Kaye, Reducing the Human Costs in Family and 
Criminal Court Cases, 45 JUDGES‘ J. 1, 4 (2007) (advocating for a problem-solving approach to 
matrimonial and criminal adjudication); Judith S. Kaye, Albany Law Review Symposium: 
Refinement or Reinvention: The State of Reform in New York: The Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 831, 
831–50 (2006) (identifying and describing various levels and methods of court reform); Judith 
S. Kaye, Women Chiefs: Shaping the Third Branch, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 900–03 (2005) 
(listing Judge Kaye‘s initiatives in family law, drug courts, and integrated domestic violence 
courts); Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & 
POL‘Y REV. 125, 125–51 (2004) (detailing the problem-solving approach New York has taken 
towards judicial reform); Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic 
Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (1999) 
(describing the problem-solving approach in domestic violence cases); Judith S. Kaye, Making 
the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 1999), http://www.thedaily-
beast.com/newsweek/1999/10/10/making-the-case-for-hands-on-courts.html (explaining the 
need to shift from traditional to problem-solving approaches); Kaye, Rethinking Traditional 
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the challenges of being a woman as a lawyer and as a judge.9  And 
then there are the meta-articles where Judge Kaye, as befits 
someone who has been a journalist as well as a lawyer and judge,10 
writes about writing—writing about the writing of judicial opinions, 
in an article called Judges as Wordsmiths,11 and writing about legal 
scholarship, in an article called One Judge‟s View of Academic 
Writing.12  Another thing you can notice if you look at many of these 
articles, as I‘ve had the pleasure of doing, is that they‘re all 
beautifully written.  Some of her articles are highly theoretical, 
some are intensely practical, some are intensely personal.  
Together, they present a very impressive range of style as well as 
subject matter. 
The area that I want to focus on in my remarks today is state 
constitutional law, an area where Judge Kaye has done a fair 
amount of writing both in her judicial opinions and in a number of 
articles.  Perhaps one reason why the state constitution has drawn 
Judge Kaye‘s attention is—as she herself noted in one of her articles 
or I might not have noticed the coincidence—that she and the 
current version of the New York State Constitution were born in the 
same year.13  Now for those of you who don‘t off the top of your head 
recall what year that was, I won‘t mention it except to say that I 
think the years have been much kinder to Judith Kaye.  One of 
Kaye‘s recent articles raised the question of whether we need a new 
 
Approaches, supra note 3, at 1494–96 (advocating a shift to the problem-solving approach); 
Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How 
Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 854–55 (1997) (same). 
9 Judith S. Kaye & Anne C. Reddy, The Progress of Women Lawyers at Big Firms: Steadied 
or Simply Studied?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1942–44 (2008) (describing the slow advance 
of female lawyers at big law firms); Judith S. Kaye, My Story in Six Life Lessons, 45 JUDGES‘ 
J. 31, 32–33 (2006) (recognizing the significant progress made by women in breaking the 
gender barrier in the legal profession); Kaye, Women Chiefs: Shaping the Third Branch, 
supra note 8, at 899–900; Judith S. Kaye, Moving Mountains: A Comment on the Glass 
Ceilings and Open Doors Report, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 573–75 (1996) (same); Judith S. 
Kaye, How to Accomplish Success: The Example of Kate Stoneman, 57 ALB. L. REV. 961, 961–
71 (1994) (applauding the life and accomplishments of the first woman admitted to the New 
York Bar); Judith S. Kaye, Welcome Address: Is the Law Male?, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 
301–02 (1993) (discussing the development of feminist legal theory); Judith S. Kaye, Women 
in Law: The Law Can Change People, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929 (1991) (noting the growth in 
population of women in the legal profession); Judith S. Kaye, A Prologue in the Guise of an 
Epilogue, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 995 (1988) (discussing the barriers women continue to face in 
the legal profession). 
10 Kaye, My Story in Six Life Lessons, supra note 9, at 32. 
11 Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (1997). 
12 Judith S. Kaye, One Judge‟s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
313 (1989). 
13 Judith S. Kaye, A Double Blessing: Our State and Federal Constitutions, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 844, 849–50 (2010). 
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New York State Constitutional Convention to update the 
constitution.14 That our state constitution could stand some 
thoughtful renovation is probably another explanation for Judith 
Kaye‘s attention to it. 
Another inspiration for her interest in state constitutional law 
was undoubtedly a man whose influence I see in a number of Chief 
Judge Kaye‘s judicial opinions as well as in her scholarly writing: 
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan.15  Brennan 
talked a lot about the nature of our federalism in his judicial 
opinions and beyond, and his views led him to become a pioneer in 
the field of state constitutional law.16  He also offered clear and well-
articulated views about the philosophy of judicial interpretation, 
particularly constitutional interpretation.17 
I want to talk about one article in particular that I think is a very 
interesting and innovative piece, reflecting the Brennan influence.  
But to help you understand the context for that article, I have to put 
on my academic hat for a few minutes and give you a little bit of 
background so that you‘ll be able to place what Chief Judge Kaye is 
talking about in the article I‘m going to describe and understand 
her contributions in that article. 
III.  THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM 
As many of you know, if you studied this in law school or if you 
have been a consumer or author of opinions by New York state 
courts, state constitutions preceded the United States 
Constitution.18  States like Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and 
New York had their own constitutions that served as models for the 
United States Constitution in providing a range of limitations on 
what the state government could do, and in promising people rights 
of the kind we now tend to associate with the United States 
Constitution.19 
In Barron v. City of Baltimore,20 a case decided during the first 
 
14 Id. at 850. 
15 Judith S. Kaye, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 14 (1997). 
16 Linda Greenhouse, William Brennan, 91, Dies; Gave Court Liberal Vision, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 1997, at A1 (noting that Justice Brennan‘s 1977 State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights ―became one of the most frequently cited law review articles in 
history[.]‖).  
17 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 551–52 (1986). 
18 ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES xiii (2d ed. 2006). 
19 Id. at xii–iv. 
20 Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247–48 (1833). 
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half of the nineteenth century, the great John Marshall, Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote a historic 
opinion about the relationship between the United States 
Constitution and the states.  What he said, which most historians 
think is basically right, was that the United States Constitution, 
including the Bill of Rights and most other aspects of that 
Constitution, was not intended to apply to the states.21 
Therefore, Marshall said, if a state has done something that you 
think violates some aspect of the federal Constitution (like the Fifth 
Amendment‘s takings clause), you‘re out of luck.22  You can‘t make 
that claim.  What matters is what the applicable state constitution 
says because that‘s the only constitution that is applied to state 
actions.23  Marshall remarked that each state by its own 
constitution may limit and restrict its powers as its wisdom 
suggests.24  That means that during the eighteenth and most of the 
nineteenth century, the state constitutions were the only 
meaningful constraints on state power.25  The federal government 
was not very big at the time and so the state constitutions were 
really the most important sources of law in the country.26  
That situation changed quite radically during the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  After the Civil War, the Reconstruction 
Amendments dramatically expanded the authority of the United 
 
21 Id. at 250 (―These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply 
them to the state governments.  This court cannot so apply them.‖).  
22 See id.  
23 See id. 
24 Id. at 247–48 (―In their several constitutions [the states] have imposed such restrictions 
on their respective governments, as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most 
proper for themselves.  It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others 
interfere no farther than they are supposed to have a common interest.‖). 
25 See Brennan, supra note 17, at 537 (noting that James Madison was a political anomaly 
in his day for promoting a stronger centralized government at a time when the individual 
states were considered far likelier guardians of individual liberties).  
 26 Id. Justice Brennan himself contributed enormously to the burgeoning law and literature 
on state constitutionalism.  Greenhouse, supra note 16; Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law 
Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 155053 (1985); see William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977) 
[hereinafter Brennan, Individual Rights] (urging state courts to be more attentive to the 
liberties protected in state constitutions); see also Brennan, supra note 17; William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Foreword: Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. 
REV. 11 (1988); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Law of the Land: The North Carolina 
Constitution and State Constitutional Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1701 (1992); William J. Brennan, 
Jr., Foreword: Symposium on the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (1988). In 1986, 
Justice Brennan said that ―[r]ediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections 
afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions . . . is probably the most important 
development in constitutional jurisprudence in our times.‖  G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 165 (1998).  
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States Constitution to apply more extensively to the states.27  The 
chief impetus for this expansion of federal constitutional power was 
to prevent the southern states from continuing to treat as enslaved 
people who had become free,28 but the sweeping language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing privileges and immunities, 
due process, and equal protection of the laws, was not confined to 
this particular goal.29 
But the nineteenth-century Supreme Court interpreted most of 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment very narrowly,30 and 
so federal constitutional law wasn‘t that potent for many decades.  
It wasn‘t really until Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court, and was joined by justices like 
William Brennan, that the Supreme Court decided that the federal 
Constitution really should have teeth and really should apply to the 
states in important ways.31  The word they used—this is going to 
bring back flashes of law school, either good or bad—was 
―incorporation.‖32 The Fourteenth Amendment talks about 
limitations on the state: no state shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law, no state shall deny 
any person equal protection of the laws, etc.33  The Warren Court 
held that the broad language of the due process clause serves to 
apply most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states.34  
 
27 See Brennan, supra note 17.  The inspiration for these changes arose in part from 
political lessons taught by the Civil War, which ―exposed a serious flaw in the notion that 
states could be trusted to nurture individual rights.‖  Id. 
28 See id. 
29 Id. (―[T]he majestic goals of the Fourteenth Amendment were framed in terms of more 
general application . . . .‖). 
30 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits only state constitutional violations but not state inaction or private 
action); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872) (construing the 
privileges or immunities clause to apply only to the narrow privileges of national citizenship). 
31 See Brennan, supra note 17, at 540 (―[T]he [Warren] Court fundamentally reshaped the 
law of this land.‖). 
32 See id. at 540–46 (describing the process of incorporation and explaining the 
incorporation debate). 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
34 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (applying to the states the double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) 
(applying to the states the Sixth Amendment‘s right to trial by jury in criminal cases ); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (applying to the states the Sixth Amendment 
right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in one‘s favor); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (applying to the states the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment); 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (applying to the states the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by an impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (applying to the 
states the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 
(1964) (applying to the states the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment); Gideon 
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Those rights are incorporated.  The Warren Court raised the floor, 
imposing obligations on the states—in the area of criminal justice, 
racial justice, etc.—that the states were not imposing on 
themselves.  Thus emerged the idea that the Supreme Court is the 
primary guarantor, in essential ways, of federal rights and that the 
federal Constitution is the primary guarantor of everyone‘s rights.  
Thereafter, if people in a state had a complaint that state actors 
were depriving them of an incorporated federal constitutional 
right—preventing them from exercising their religion, preventing 
them from exercising free speech, subjecting them to police 
misconduct or to an unfair trial—the Civil Rights Era that grew 
from the 1950s and ‘60s onward led people to turn to the federal 
courts and to expect the federal Constitution to define and protect 
their rights more expansively than their state would have been 
inclined to do.35 
The great Warren Court decisions started with Brown v. Board of 
Education.36  Where do you go if you don‘t like the fact that your 
state has racially segregated schools?  You go to federal court and 
you tell the federal judges to stop the state from violating your 
rights.  Where do you go if you think that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment is being used in your trial?  You 
go to federal court because the federal courts apply an exclusionary 
rule, while New York State at the time did not.37  So during the 
Warren Court era, people become accustomed to the Supreme Court 
raising the floor of constitutional protection.  Some said the Court 
was nationalizing the Bill of Rights.38  The Supreme Court set the 
federal Constitution as the lowest common denominator of rights 
 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (applying to the states the Sixth Amendment‘s 
assistance of counsel clause); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying to the 
states the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (applying to the states the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
and declaring that the Fourth Amendment ―is enforceable in the same manner and to like 
effect as other basic rights secured by the due process clause‖). 
35 See Brennan, Individual Rights, supra note 26, at 540. 
36 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
37 See People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 22, 26 (1926) (refusing to apply an exclusionary rule 
in Fourth Amendment cases).  The Supreme Court later diverted Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule claims from federal courts by limiting their availability as a basis for 
habeas corpus petitions.  See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976) (restricting habeas 
corpus petitions when prisoners are given a ―full and fair opportunity‖ to litigate their Fourth 
Amendment claims at the state level). 
38 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. 
L. REV. 929, 933 (1965) (discussing the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through 
incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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throughout the country.39  No state was allowed to do less, to be less 
protective of any incorporated right, than what that federal floor 
provided.40 
When you have a dramatic revolution like this, greatly expanding 
federal authority to limit what the states can do, there inevitably 
will be backlash.  Particularly in the southern states, there was a 
lot of grumbling about the fact that the federal government was 
telling the states what to do.41  Some of these complaints took the 
form of arguments about states‘ rights; people started talking about 
the Tenth Amendment, contending that the states have a right to be 
autonomous and do what they want, so how can the federal courts 
be telling the states what to do?42  The phrase ―states‘ rights,‖ 
particularly in some southern states, began to seem to observers in 
the North like code for ―we don‘t like Brown v. Board of Education 
and we want to continue to be racist.‖  The valorization of 
federalism claims was regarded by some as nothing more than a 
veneer for opposition to civil rights.43 
But ―states‘ rights‖ complaints about the Warren Court did 
resuscitate a profound question we have been struggling with ever 
 
39 See id. at 937–38 (discussing how judicial decision-making responsibilities apply to state 
action by the federal government and the states). 
40 See id. at 935–36 (discussing the extent of ―absorption‖ of the Bill of Rights into state 
law). 
41 See John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional Law—
Why Don‟t the „Primacy‟ States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1023 
n.18 (1993) (noting the southern states‘ aversion to incorporation and preference for using 
state constitutional analysis). 
42 Id. 
43 The affiliation of states‘ rights arguments and racism is reflected at various points in 
our history.  The State of Kansas raised federalism and majoritarian rights arguments in its 
brief opposing school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education.  Brief for Appellant on 
Reargument at 16, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (―The people of 
Kansas, through the normal processes of local government, are demonstrating their 
willingness and capacity to deal with local race problems in a manner most beneficial to all 
concerned.  Federal interference is neither necessary nor justified.‖).  In an earlier era, the 
rights of states were asserted to explain opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment‘s ban on 
involuntary servitude.  See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for 
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 49 & n.166 (2004) (quoting a 
congressional representative who acknowledged that the ―race issue‖ of slavery had become 
―‗merged in the higher issue of the right of the states to control their domestic affairs . . . .‘‖ 
(Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2615 (1864) (statement of Rep. Anson Herrick)).  And post-
Warren Court politicians have resorted to using states‘ rights positions as a proxy for 
arguments about policies pertaining to race.  See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., History and 
Calumny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/opinion/09 
brooks.html (discussing President Ronald Reagan‘s stress on state‘s rights, not civil rights, in 
his 1980 election campaign); Roger Wilkins, Smiling Racism: Ronald Reagan‟s Race Politics, 
NATION, Nov. 3, 1984, at 347 (arguing that states‘ rights campaign slogans gave Reagan ―a 
way to make racism palatable and politically potent again‖). 
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since the founding of the republic: what do we mean by federalism?  
Do we mean we‘re going to have fifty different kinds of flowers 
blooming in fifty different gardens, each of which is going to look 
unique?  Do we mean we are going to have a uniform garden with 
the same flowers throughout?  Or do we mean that we‘re going to 
have a garden that‘s carefully designed and orchestrated so it has 
common themes and motifs, even though there might be different 
blooms in different parts of the garden? 
I‘ll give you one example of a case where the Supreme Court 
confronted a real challenge based on a claim of local difference.  
There‘s a case from the 1960s called Duncan v. Louisiana, in which 
Gary Duncan complained about the fact that he was tried for a 
crime in Louisiana and was not afforded a jury trial.44  Why didn‘t 
Louisiana choose to give him a jury trial?  Those of you who have 
been to New Orleans or know anything about Louisiana know that 
Louisiana was settled by people coming from the French civil law 
tradition and not only the Anglo-American tradition which vaunted 
jury trials.45  Everyone agreed that it is possible to have a fair trial 
that‘s not a trial by jury.  So Louisiana said, ―Our tradition, our 
culture, our heritage is not the heritage of the Anglo-American jury 
trial, and we do things differently.  We don‘t choose to spend our 
money on jury trials.  We don‘t choose to give our citizens that kind 
of involvement and we think that should be our choice as long as 
our trials are fair.‖  In Duncan, the Supreme Court disagreed: if 
Louisiana is going to be one state in the union, the Court said, then 
Gary Duncan should have the same right to a trial by a jury of his 
peers in Louisiana as he would in any other state.46  Louisiana 
cannot choose to differ in this fundamental respect. 
So the Warren Court revolution ratcheted up the limitations on 
the states and required the states to be more uniform and more 
consistent, promoting the ideal of nationally shared values.  Well, 
the Warren Court isn‘t with us anymore.  I‘m sure most of you have 
noticed that.  As the years passed and the pendulum swung, the 
Supreme Court began carving out more exceptions and finding 
fewer rights, and in some areas the nation-wide floor was lowered.  
 
44 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968). 
45 See Harriet J. Bauman, French Creoles in Louisiana: An American Tale, YALE-NEW 
HAVEN TEACHER‘S INST., http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1992/2/92.02.02.x.html 
(last visited May 22, 2012) (providing a timeline and outline of the history of Louisiana, which 
features a dominant French colonial heritage).  Accordingly, much of Louisiana‘s legal 
ideology derives from French culture rather than English heritage.  See id. 
46 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149–50. 
20_HERMAN 7/30/2012  5:06 PM 
2011/2012] Portrait of a Judge: Judith S. Kaye 1991 
So at that point, William Brennan, a key figure here, started to 
write about the state constitutions.47  The state constitutions had 
been upstaged during the middle of the twentieth century by the 
federal Constitution.  If you can‘t go below the federally set floor, it 
doesn‘t really matter whether the states would have chosen to do so.  
They were required to meet the generally more demanding federal 
standards. 
Brennan, along with other scholars and judges like Justice Hans 
Linde of Oregon, urged renewed attention to the state 
constitutions.48  As the federal floor lowered and there were fewer 
federal requirements for the states to follow, the states had the 
opportunity to, in Justice Marshall‘s phrase, do ―as their own 
wisdom would suggest.‖49 
As the Warren Court monolith was dismantled bit by bit, the key 
question became, ―What are we going to do in our state now that the 
Supreme Court is leaving us more choice?‖   
If you want to read a wonderfully articulate account of the history 
of the role of the state constitutions that I‘m briefly recounting 
today, I would highly recommend Judith Kaye‘s 1987 article, Dual 
Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, based on a speech she 
gave at the New York City Bar Association.50  In this article, Chief 
Judge Kaye does an excellent job of describing the background and 
history of the role of the state constitutions, which had waxed and 
waned over time.51  The article then takes up the idea that Justice 
Brennan and Justice Linde had been promoting, that it was about 
time for everyone in the country to wake up and start paying more 
attention to the importance of state constitutions.52  This was a 
 
47 See sources cited supra, notes 17 & 26; Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of 
State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421–22 (1996); Ann Lousin, 
Foreword: Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a Federal Judge Who Believes in State's Rights, 20 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 12 (1986).  
48 See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States‟ Bills of Rights, 9 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 379, 380 (1980) (arguing state bills of rights are the most fundamental, being 
both ―first in time and first in logic‖); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and 
State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 17983 (1984) (urging autonomous Georgia constitutional 
interpretation with the adoption of Georgia‘s new bill of rights); Jerome B. Falk, Jr., 
Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than “Adequate” Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. 
REV. 273 (1973); Vern Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); 
Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val. 
U. L. REV. 125 (1969). 
49 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247–48 (1833). 
50 Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 
399 (1987). 
51 See id. at 400–08, 412–20. 
52 Id. at 417–18. 
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necessary reminder because most people who were trained as 
lawyers in this country during the 1960s and even after were 
focusing exclusively on federal constitutional law.53  Those of you 
who‘ve been to law school, when you took constitutional law, did 
your course cover only federal constitutional law?  Did you hear 
much about the state constitutions?  Probably not. 
Chief Judge Kaye noted that this was a problem: not many law 
schools were paying attention to state constitutions and therefore 
there were a lot of lawyers who were missing bets because they just 
weren‘t making available arguments about how the law could or 
should be configured in particular states.  Most everyone had 
become distracted by the federal constitutional debates and forgot 
that there was this whole other body of law.  I‘ve never mentioned 
this to Chief Judge Kaye, but she might be interested to know that 
for years now I have taught a class on state constitutional law, at 
least one class in my basic constitutional law course.  One of the 
main things I assign the students to read is Chief Judge Kaye‘s 
article on Dual Constitutionalism, because it does such an excellent 
job of really setting out so much of what they need to know.  I also 
assign one or two sample state constitutional law opinions and the 
incredibly prolix index of the New York State Constitution, which 
goes on for pages and pages, plus the fifteen-section New York Bill 
of Rights, so that they can compare the federal and state 
constitutions. 
I have a wonderful research assistant who, like a couple of you 
here today, was in my constitutional law class.  While I was 
preparing to speak to you today, I explained to her what I was going 
to cover so that she could help me to gather and sort through the 
mountains of opinions and mountains of articles that Chief Judge 
Kaye had written.  And when I told her that my starting point for 
my talk would be the article on Dual Constitutionalism, she said to 
me, ―Oh, I loved that article!  Great!  Wonderful!  My colleagues will 
be jealous.‖  And she and I are not the only ones who loved that 
article. 
Now I want to tell you more about what was in that article 
because, in addition to being a terrific introduction to state 
constitutional law, this article is another very good example of the 
 
53 See Brennan, supra note 17, at 548 (protesting that state courts were so focused on 
interpreting federal constitutional rulings in state cases that they didn‘t know how to 
interpret their own state constitutions); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States‟ 
Bills of Rights, supra note 48, at 381 (reminding law schools and educators that ―[t]he Federal 
Bill of Rights did not supersede those of the states‖).  
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multifaceted Kaye approach.  I think you can see many different 
aspects of my portrait of this judge as I talk about the portrait 
embodied in Dual Constitutionalism.  The author of this article is a 
historian, a teacher, a writer, a New York patriot, and a true and 
imaginative scholar.  This 1987 article draws attention to the New 
York State Constitution in particular, noting a number of things 
about our Constitution that are truly unique.54  Justice Brennan 
and Justice Linde had been talking about state constitutions in 
general, but Chief Judge Kaye was one of the first to apply their 
points to the New York State Constitution and to urge New Yorkers 
to practice the art of state constitutional law. 
This is another thing that I cover in my constitutional law class: 
comparisons between the New York State Constitution and the 
United States Constitution.  If you look at the two side by side, 
there are a number of provisions in the state constitution that 
simply don‘t exist in the federal Constitution.  There‘s a right to 
education in New York.55  There‘s a very different definition of equal 
protection that, unlike the federal Constitution, doesn‘t entail state 
action requirements.56  There are a number of provisions that are 
wholly unique.57  The search and seizure provision, guaranteeing 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizures, is also remarkable.  
In my criminal procedure class, we compare the search and seizure 
provision of the New York State Constitution with the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  When you line up 
those two provisions, you‘ll notice that the first paragraphs are 
exactly the same—they both say, ―The right of the people to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated,‖ etc.58  The federal Fourth Amendment only has one 
paragraph. But there‘s a second paragraph in the New York State 
Constitution which says, ―The right of the people to be secure 
against unreasonable interception of [telephonic] and [telegraphic] 
 
54 Kaye, supra note 50, at 408–09. 
55 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
56 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
57 See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (protecting ski trails in Essex County); N.Y. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9 (prohibiting unregulated gambling except parimutuel betting on horse races). 
58 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖), with 
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖). 
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communications shall not be violated,‖ etc.59  This amendment is 
dated 1938.60 
The Supreme Court‘s 1928 opinion in Olmstead v. United States,61 
holding that the Fourth Amendment doesn‘t cover wiretapping of 
telephones, always stimulates a very interesting discussion about 
constitutional interpretation and originalism.  Does the Fourth 
Amendment mean exactly what James Madison would have thought 
it meant?  If we know that if we said to James Madison, ―Did you 
intend this language to cover telephone wiretapping?‖ and he‘d say, 
―Huh?,‖  is that the end of the story?  That was the view of the 
Supreme Court in the Olmstead case in 1928.  Because the Fourth 
Amendment, in the view of the framers, was only intended to cover 
physical intrusions, you would need to amend the Constitution to 
have it cover wiretapping of telephones. 
In 1938, the framers of the New York State Constitution accepted 
that invitation.  They added a paragraph after their replication of 
the Fourth Amendment which explicitly says that the privacy of 
telephone conversations should also be protected.62  It is perfectly 
clear that the framers of this amendment to the New York State 
Constitution rejected the holding of Olmstead.  They wanted to 
protect the right of the people of New York to have private 
conversations in a way that the Supreme Court had decided the 
Fourth Amendment, at that point in time, did not.  This is all very 
interesting as constitutional theory, but it also gives you some sense 
of the arguments lawyers would be missing if they were to ignore 
the state constitution.  If, for example, you had a client who had a 
telephone wiretapped during much of the twentieth century, all that 
federal constitutional law offered was Olmstead.  So why wouldn‘t 
you point out to the New York courts that your client had greater 
rights in New York because of this provision of the New York State 
Constitution if you knew about the state constitutional provision?63 
 
59 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (―The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable 
interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex parte 
orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable ground 
to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means 
of communication, and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications 
are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.‖). 
60 Id. 
61 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–65 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
62 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
63 See Kaye, supra note 50, at 419 (explaining that New York courts have interpreted the 
state constitution as more protective of individual rights against searches and seizures than 
federal standards). 
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Another important point that Judge Kaye made in this article, 
and other places as well, is that there‘s really nothing illegitimate 
or suspect about interpreting state constitutional provisions as 
providing greater rights even when they‘re worded identically to the 
parallel federal provisions.64  The point is that a state constitution is 
a unique document: its text may be different, its history may be 
different, local conditions may be different, and the values of New 
York State may be distinctive.65 
There‘s a case that is a very good example to me of what is special 
about New York, a 1992 case that I teach in my criminal procedure 
class called People v. Scott.66  In this case, Judge Kaye wrote a 
masterful concurring opinion directly talking to her colleagues to 
explain her view of state constitutions and the proper interpretation 
of them.67  Her concurring opinion was also talking back to a 1924 
Supreme Court decision that had construed Fourth Amendment 
rights quite narrowly.  In Hester v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court had reviewed an incident where government agents 
had gone not into someone‘s home, but into their open fields.68  
(Doesn‘t that sound old-fashioned, a Thomas Hardy vision of a 
countryside composed of open fields?)  The Supreme Court held 
that, as with the telephone in Olmstead, you don‘t have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in your open field.69  Anybody 
including any government agent can walk into your open field and 
see what you‘re up to, and therefore if a government agent wants to 
walk into your open field on purpose to see, for example, whether 
you happen to be growing marijuana in the back forty there, why 
not?  You don‘t have any Fourth Amendment rights. 
When the New York Court of Appeals reviewed a similar incident 
in 1992, the court looked at the New York State constitutional 
search and seizure provision, which, as I have described, was clearly 
intended to be broader than the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  And so, despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court had found no Fourth Amendment rights in this open field 
situation, the Court of Appeals found that Scott did have a right 
 
64 Id. at 400–01; People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1347 (N.Y. 1992) (Kaye, J., concurring). 
65 Kaye, supra note 50, at 423–25 (noting that state courts, being closer to the public and 
their political institutions, are more responsive in cases of constitutional misinterpretation 
and can develop constitutional law as needed more efficiently than the U.S. Supreme Court). 
66 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1328. 
67 Id. at 1347–48 (Kaye, J., concurring). 
68 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924). 
69 Id. at 59. 
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under the parallel state constitutional provision.  The text is 
somewhat different here, the history of New York is different, and 
so the right was interpreted more expansively.  Judge Hancock was 
here this morning, and I‘m going to quote him because he wrote a 
line in his majority opinion in that case that makes me proud to be 
a New Yorker.  The state had argued that there‘s no reasonable 
expectation of privacy out in open fields because if you‘re not doing 
something criminal, why should you care if anyone‘s watching what 
you‘re doing?  Judge Hancock responded, ―this presupposes the 
ideal of a conforming society, a concept which seems foreign to New 
York‘s tradition of tolerance of the unconventional or what may 
appear bizarre or even offensive.‖70 Doesn‘t that make you proud to 
be a New Yorker?  You have a special right to be bizarre, 
unconventional, and offensive. 
The dissent in Scott argued that the New York provision should 
be interpreted as meaning the same thing as the Fourth 
Amendment.71  But Judge Kaye in her concurring opinion made the 
same arguments she had made in her Dual Constitutionalism 
article, eloquently expressing her belief that the state constitution 
is a different and unique document, with a unique history and 
context, and so it is the job of the highest court in New York State to 
interpret that document independently rather than simply following 
the Supreme Court‘s federal constitutional case law in lockstep.72 
So New York can be an enclave.  In New York, then, people do 
have the right to be bizarre and offensive and nobody can just walk 
into your open fields to see if you‘re growing marijuana.  
Government agents are going to have to get a search warrant first.  
Isn‘t that reassuring?  A number of other states have made similar 
choices to extend search and seizure protections based on their own 
unique state constitutions.73  James Madison once referred to 
 
70 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1337 (citing People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 564 (N.Y. 
1986); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494 (N.Y. 1986); Bellanca v. N.Y.S. Liquor 
Auth., 429 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940–41 (N.Y. 
1980)). 
71 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1351 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 1347 (Kaye, J., concurring); see also Kaye, supra note 50, at 424 & n.81 
(explaining the ―interplay‖ of parallel state and federal constitutional protections). 
73 See Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS. L.J. 417, 
418 (2007) (surveying points of state divergence from Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
case law); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten 
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process 
Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (discussing whether it is appropriate for states to interpret 
their state constitutions in a more right-protecting manner than the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the U.S. Constitution). 
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federalism as a ―double security‖ for our rights.74  One article that I 
especially admire refers to federalism as a ―self-correcting 
constitutional compass.‖75  If the federal courts are interpreting the 
federal constitution and setting the floor too low, the state 
constitutions can build on that floor.  Then there will be enclaves of 
freedom and equality around the country.  If you live in or travel to 
New York, you‘re going to have more rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  If you live in or travel to Florida, you‘re 
not.76  State by state. 
Judge Kaye referred to what Madison called a ―double security‖ 
as a ―double blessing.‖77  She pointed out that the states, in addition 
to taking care of what happens within their own state, within their 
own enclave, can serve as laboratories for new policies and as 
models for the other states.78  So if the Supreme Court says that 
telephone conversations are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment at all, the New York Court of Appeals can offer an 
alternative by explaining why that conclusion is wrong and 
unnecessary, at least according to the New York State Constitution.  
Perhaps other states will then be persuaded to provide greater 
rights to their own residents.  And eventually, the Supreme Court 
might recognize the wisdom of the New York position and federal 
constitutional law itself could change.  In this way, the states can 
indeed be laboratories.  New York State can participate in an active 
dialogue with all the other states and the federal courts by 
providing a model of a well-reasoned opinion saying, ―This is how it 
should be.  Government agents should not have the right to find out 
what everyone‘s talking about on their telephones or doing in their 
open fields unless they‘ve obtained a warrant.‖  New York, by its 
example, might precipitate changes in the law of part or all of the 
 
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 333 (Robert Scigliano ed., Random House 2000) (1788).  
    75 Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 725, 731 (1981). 
76 The Florida Constitution, because of a fairly recent backlash amendment, requires state 
courts to interpret its search and seizure rights in conformity with U.S. Fourth Amendment 
law.  FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (―The right . . . against unreasonable searches . . . shall be 
construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.  Articles or information obtained in 
violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would 
be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.‖). 
77 Kaye, supra note 13, at 847; THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 74.   
78 Kaye, supra note 13, at 847.  Others have pointed this out too, including, most notably, 
Justice Louis Brandeis.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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nation. 
One function of legal scholarship is to describe what the law is 
and what the law has been.  Chief Judge Kaye has done this kind of 
teaching in her scholarship.  And one of the highest callings of 
scholarship is not just to describe what is and has been, but to be 
visionary about what law might be.  There‘s a fascinating part of 
Chief Judge Kaye‘s Dual Constitutionalism article that I think has 
not received enough notice.  I‘ve never seen this theory articulated 
in the same way any place else.  Chief Judge Kaye adds one more 
level to the federalist structure I have just described.  Not only can 
New York State be an enclave where we may have greater rights for 
our residents if that‘s what the New York Constitution seems to 
intend; not only can New York serve as a persuasive model in which 
other states might follow our lead in deciding to grant additional 
rights to their people; not only can New York judges write 
persuasive opinions that might lead federal judges to change their 
own minds.  Chief Judge Kaye goes a step further by weaving one of 
the most enigmatic parts of the federal Constitution into her 
analysis: the Ninth Amendment.79  The Ninth Amendment says 
that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the 
people.80  The basic idea of the Ninth Amendment seems to be that 
just because there are some rights listed in the Bill of Rights, that 
does not mean there aren‘t also other rights.81  Some people have 
dismissed the Ninth Amendment as nothing more than a truism: 
just because we named some rights doesn‘t mean there might not be 
other rights too.82  But people have been in disagreement for a long 
time about what those other rights might be and about what the 
Ninth Amendment really means.  Some of you may remember from 
law school the case of Griswold v. Connecticut,83 which found an 
implied constitutional right to reproductive freedom, in part on the 
basis of the Ninth Amendment.84 
Chief Judge Kaye has a different conception of the Ninth 
 
79 See Kaye, supra note 50, at 426. 
80 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (―The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.‖). 
81 Kaye, supra note 50, at 427. 
82 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).   
83 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. 
84 Id. at 485–86; see also id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the right to 
privacy in a marital relationship is a basic right ―within the meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment‖). 
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Amendment.  She describes it in this article as creating a right of 
the People to establish and alter the principles of government.85  
She argues that the Ninth Amendment‘s reference to the rights 
―retained by the people‖ really means that the states can directly 
alter federal constitutional law—that the state courts and the state 
constitutions are in a two-way direct dialogue with the federal 
government.86  Under her theory, if enough states all interpret 
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures as meaning 
that government agents can‘t go into your open fields or tap your 
telephones without a warrant, at some point the fact that so many 
states have concluded this should filter back directly into federal 
constitutional interpretation.87   
This is not only a theory of federalism—that the dialogue goes 
both ways, that state courts have the power to constrain federal 
courts, in addition to federal courts telling the states what to do.  
It‘s also a unique theory of federal constitutional interpretation.  
Under Kaye‘s vision of the Ninth Amendment, a dynamic dual 
constitutionalism is incorporated into the constitutional text itself.  
Federal constitutional law of necessity must be flexible and must 
change in order to take account of what most of the people in most 
of the states think.  So if the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth 
Amendment as oblivious to certain kinds of privacy, the states can 
push back and insist that their own views of the importance of 
privacy transform federal constitutional law itself on that subject.88  
If enough states agree, under Kaye‘s theory, the Supreme Court 
would have to listen. 
The Supreme Court has not expressly adopted Judith Kaye‘s 
interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, and they certainly haven‘t 
cited her article.  But Judith Kaye says in one of her articles that 
she thinks the Ninth Amendment‘s time will come.89  And what I 
think is fascinating is that in a way, her prediction has come true.  
Here‘s what the Supreme Court has been doing, albeit without 
mentioning the Ninth Amendment.  Recent federal constitutional 
interpretation has been directly responsive to what‘s been 
happening in the states in a number of areas.  I‘ll give you two 
different examples. 
The first example is the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits 
 
85 Kaye, supra note 50, at 428. 
86 Id. at 427–28. 
87 Id. at 426. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
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cruel and unusual punishment.90  What does that prohibition mean?  
For a long time the Supreme Court has said that to determine 
what‘s cruel and unusual, we have to look at what everyone in our 
society is doing and not doing.91 
There are three Eighth Amendment opinions within the last 
decade which all adopt the same very particular state canvassing 
methodology, and they are all cases about the imposition of the 
death penalty.  As I am sure you know, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the position that the death penalty is in and of itself cruel 
and unusual.92  But the Court has decided three cases which find 
the death penalty to be cruel and unusual as imposed in particular 
circumstances: Atkins v. Virginia,93 Roper v. Simmons,94 and 
Kennedy v. Louisiana.95  In one of those cases, the Supreme Court 
says it is cruel and unusual to execute people who are mentally 
retarded, because they are neither deterrable nor blameworthy.96  
How can you execute someone who did not have the capacity to 
know what he or she was doing?  In the second, the Court held that 
it is cruel and unusual to execute a person for a crime committed as 
a juvenile because juveniles are not mature enough to appreciate 
what they are doing.97  And in the third, the Court found that it is 
cruel and unusual to execute people for crimes that do not result 
and were not intended to result in anyone‘s death.98 
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court used the same, quite 
controversial, methodology.  Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing two 
out of three of these opinions, counted noses, looking at what was 
happening in all of the states.99  There is a lot of arithmetic in these 
opinions.  How many states do not apply the death penalty to the 
mentally retarded, or to juveniles, or to non-homicide offenses?  In 
how many states have the legislatures recently changed their minds 
 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖). 
91 Specifically, ―[t]o determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must 
look beyond historical conceptions to ‗the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.‘‖ Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) 
(stating that the power to punish must be ―exercised within the limits of civilized standards‖). 
92 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
93 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
94 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
95 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
96 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
97 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
98 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
99 Id. at 423; Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. 
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and decided to make the death penalty inapplicable in such 
circumstances?100  It used to be the case that X number of states 
allowed execution of juveniles, but now Y number of states do not 
allow such executions.  Kennedy examines the numbers and the 
trends.  So in the Eighth Amendment area, if you get enough 
states—either by their legislatures or by their state courts 
interpreting their own constitutions—concluding that it is cruel to 
execute people for crimes committed while they were juveniles, 
those decisions then throw roots into federal constitutional law.  
That is a direct impact of state decisions on federal constitutional 
law, not just a matter of federal judges deciding that a particular 
state court opinion is persuasive and should be followed.  And that 
is essentially the Ninth Amendment vision of Judith Kaye—that 
state decisions in the aggregate can directly transform federal law. 
One other example of this two-way, state-federal dialogue is in 
the case of Lawrence v. Texas,101 where the Court‘s decision was 
based on substantive due process.102  The question there was 
whether the Texas law that criminalized consensual sodomy was a 
violation of due process because it unduly infringed on the liberty to 
decide on one‘s lifestyle.103  In the opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 
Justice Kennedy uses the same methodology as in the Eighth 
Amendment cases to reach this result.  He looks at the number of 
states criminalizing consensual sodomy, he counts up how many 
state legislatures have recently changed their minds and decided to 
decriminalize consensual sodomy, and considers the number of state 
courts which have found criminalization of consensual sodomy to 
violate their own state constitutions.104  He counts, he reviews the 
numbers and the trends, and he sees which way the wind is 
blowing.  And because so many states have made the decision in 
their own enclaves, in their own states, to say, ―This is not 
something that the government should be permitted to do, to 
criminalize people because of their chosen sexual lives,‖ that liberty 
now has become enshrined as part of federal constitutional law. 
IV.  CHIEF JUDGE KAYE, VINDICATED 
So Chief Judge Kaye, one gift I want to give you today is the gift 
 
100 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–678. 
101 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
102 Id. at 578. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 573, 577–78. 
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of vindication.  I have not seen anybody formally put together your 
concept of the Ninth Amendment and the dynamic workings of 
federalism in the Supreme Court cases I‘ve just described.  In 
addition to being a very fine explication of how dual 
constitutionalism works and could work, your article‘s vision of dual 
constitutionalism as a two-way street, as a way for the states, in 
combination, to have a direct impact on federal constitutional law, 
was prescient. 
Chief Judge Kaye has also written other articles expanding on 
her ideas about state constitutional law and dual 
constitutionalism.105  And I think another very appropriate note 
here is that when NYU Law School started a lecture series named 
for Justice William Brennan, Chief Judge Kaye gave the inaugural 
William Brennan lecture.106  Quite appropriately, she talked about 
this tradition of state constitutional law.  I think that Justice 
Brennan would have been delighted with the choice of speaker and 
of topic.107 
In addition to her views on state constitutional law, Chief Judge 
Kaye also has complex and nuanced ideas about when courts should 
use constitutional interpretation and when they should prefer other 
available tools, like state common law.108  There are other New York 
Court of Appeals opinions that I teach in my criminal procedure 
class, including a case called People v. Hollman, in which the New 
York Court of Appeals laid out a number of rules for police-citizen 
encounters that are based not on the state constitution but rather 
on state common law.109  And Judith Kaye has written engagingly 
on these topics as well. 110 
The care with which Judith Kaye set about making nuanced 
decisions about what type of law to apply in individual cases is also 
completely consistent with the care she lavished on her judicial 
opinions and her 200 articles, the care she took in managing the 
 
105 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 13; Judith S. Kaye, State Constitutional Law and the State 
High Courts in the 21st Century, 70 ALB. L. REV. 825 (2007); Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. 
Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 373 (2001); Judith S. Kaye, Foreword: State Courts in Our Federal System: The 
Contribution of the New York Court of Appeals, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 217 (1996); Judith S. 
Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of American 
Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49 (1988). 
106 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts 
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995). 
107 Id.; see also Kaye, supra note 15 (honoring Justice William Brennan). 
108 Kaye, supra note 106, at 5–11. 
109 People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 212 (N.Y. 1992). 
110 See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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courts of New York State, and—this will be the last note I will offer 
toward my part of the portrait of this judge—the care she takes in 
selecting her shoes. 
